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CIVIL PROCEDURE: ANALYSIS OF 1977-78 SEVENTH
CIRCUIT OPINIONS ADDRESSING ATTORNEY-CLIENT
RELATIONSHIP, CLASS ACTION PROBLEMS, MAGISTRATES'
JURISDICTION, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND
INDISPENSABLE PARTIES
ROBERT T. MCALLISTER*
MICHAEL J. HOWLETT, JR.** ***
A review of the 1977-78 decisions by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in the area of Civil Procedure leaves
the distinct impression that lawyers in the Seventh Circuit are well ac-
quainted with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and are very will-
ing to employ them in order to gain a tactical advantage. A few
opinions issued this term will have national importance.' In addition,
the court routinely ruled on numerous procedural points adding addi-
tional depth to the growing body of case law. Unfortunately, the limi-
tations of time and space prevent comment on many of the Seventh
Circuit's procedural rulings.2 An examination of the more significant
* Assistant United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois; J.D., Loyola Uni-
versity (Chicago) School of Law, 1974; Former law clerk to Hon. William J. Bauer, United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
** J.D., University of Notre Dame, 1973; Former Assistant United States Attorney; Former
law clerk to Hon. William J. Bauer, Sole practitioner in civil and criminal litigation.
*** The authors wish to acknowledge the assistance and cooperation of Ann Whitney, se-
nior law student at lIT/Chicago-Kent College of Law, in the preparation of this article. None of
the views expressed are that of the United States Department of Justice but are solely the authors'
opinions.
1. Eg., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3311 (U.S. Nov. 6, 1978) (No. 78-422).
2. Other procedural decisions rendered by the Seventh Circuit during the 1977-78 term but
not discussed in this article include: Ford v. Carballo, 577 F.2d 404 (7th Cir. 1978) (reimburse-
ment of costs of producing and guarding state prisoner ordered by writ to appear in federal civil
action); Allan v. SEC, 577 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1978) (federal subject matter jurisdiction to stay
administrative sanction pending administrative appeal); Rohler v. TRW, Inc., 576 F.2d 1260 (7th
Cir. 1978) (reversal of dismissal for failure to state statutory. jurisdiction); Mirabel v. General
Motors Acceptance Corp., 576 F.2d 729 (7th Cir. 1978), petitionfor cert. filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3278
(U.S. Oct. 11, 1978) (No. 78-611) (award of attorney's fees); Chapman v. United States, 575 F.2d
147 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3244 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1978) (No. 78-108) (federal
admiralty tort jurisdiction); Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. United States, 574 F.2d 926 (7th Cir.
1978), petition for cert.fledsub nom Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. ICC; 47 U.S.L.W. 3168 (U.S.
Sept. 11, 1978) (No. 78-411) (law of the case); Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway & Park Dist., 574 F.2d
892 (7th Cir.), Yacated, 435 U.S. 992 (1978) (federal injunctive jurisdiction); Roberts v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 573 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3213 (U.S. Oct. 2, 1978)
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decisions during the year follows.
ATrORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp. 3 is an opinion
which may dramatically affect the practice of law in large law firms for
years to come. Since the decision was announced in July 1978, the con-
ference rooms of the large and established corporate law firms have
been filled with argument and debate over the holding. Additionally,
the decision may have an important effect on every individual con-
sumer of energy in the United States. Interestingly enough, the key
legal issue does not involve the merits of the case. Instead the problem
concerns a procedural point, L e., which lawyers can properly present
the case and allegedly seek to protect the public interest.
The case was initially filed in the United States District Court for
(Nos. 78-26, 78-29) (applicability of Illinois election of remedies doctrine in federal court); Air-
lines Stewards & Stewardesses Ass'n v. American Airlines, 573 F.2d 960 (7th Cir. 1978), cert
denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3210 (U.S. Oct. 2, 1978) (No. 77-1758) (district court approval of proposed
settlement without decision on the merits of each plaintiffs claims); Mitchell v. Archibald &
Kendall, Inc., 573 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1978) (failure to state claim upon which relief may be granted
under Illinois negligence law); Liberty Sav. Ass'n v. Sun Bank, 572 F.2d 591 (7th Cir. 1978) (de-
claratory judgment action to decide which bank's claim to savings account is superior under Illi-
nois law); Zbaraz v. Quern, 572 F.2d 582 (7th Cir. 1978) (improper federal abstention from Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1399 (1976) and equal protection challenge to state law limiting
public assistance funding of abortion); James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 572 F.2d
574 (7th Cir. 1978) (law of the case); Craft v. Economy Fire & Cas. Co., 572 F.2d 565 (7th Cir.
1978) (summary judgment); Sturgeon v. Avon Prods., Inc., 571 F.2d 5 (7th Cir. 1978) (federal
remedies under Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 § 3, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976));
Guse v. J.C. Penney Co., 570 F.2d 679 (7th Cir. 1978) (leave to amend and cost of appeal); Hospi-
tal Employees Labor Program v. Ridgeway Hosp., 570 F.2d 167 (7th Cir. 1978) (federal jurisdic-
tion under Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-562 (1976)); Lewin v.
Commissioner, 569 F.2d 444 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 3090 (1978) (tax court jurisdiction
when petition filed after statutory limit); Mancuso v. Indiana Harbor Belt R.R., 568 F.2d 553 (7th
Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (final appealable orders); Speaker Sortation Sys. v. United States Postal
Serv., 568 F.2d 46 (7th Cir. 1978) (collateral estoppel); Chicago Transit Auth. v. Flohr, 570 F.2d
1305 (7th Cir. 1977) (declaratory judgment action seeking statutory interpretation of term, "rail-
road"); National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 570 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 47
U.S.L.W. 3218 (U.S. Oct. 2, 1978) (No. 77-155 1); Miller-Davis Co. v. Illinois State Tollway High-
way Auth., 567 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1977) (abstention inappropriate before federal jurisdiction es-
tablished; federal jurisdiction upheld over eleventh amendment challenge); Panther Pumps &
Equip. Co. v. Hydrocraft, Inc., 566 F.2d 8 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1887 (1978)
(substitution of parties in privity under FED. R. CIv. P. 25(c)); Mathers Fund, Inc. v. Colwell Co.,
564 F.2d 780 (7th Cir. 1977) (failure to state claim upon which relief may be granted under Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940, §§ 1-53, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1-806-21 (1976)); Chesapeake & Ohio Ry.
v. Illinois Central Gulf R.R., 564 F.2d 222 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. dismissed, 435 U.S. 919 (1978)
(estoppel from raising theory of liability not previously raised); Jordan v. Trainor, 563 F.2d 873
(7th Cir. 1977), cert. grantedsub non Quern v. Jordan, 435 U.S. 904 (1978); Barnes v. St. Cathe-
rine's Hosp., 563 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1977) (district court fact findings not clearly erroneous; denial
of new trial not abuse of discretion); Milprint, Inc. v. Curwood, Inc., 562 F.2d 418 (7th Cir. 1977)
(federal jurisdiction under patent laws when declaratory judgment plaintiff is testing defense
which normally could only be raised in state court).
3. 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3311 (U.S. Nov. 6, 1978) (No. 78-
422).
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the Northern District of Illinois and assigned to Judge Prentice H. Mar-
shall in October 1976. Plaintiff Westinghouse, represented by the law
firm of Kirkland & Ellis, named as defendants twenty-nine foreign and
domestic uranium producing companies, alleging that they violated the
antitrust laws by forming an illegal conspiracy in restraint of trade.
Four of the defendant corporations moved to disqualify Kirkland &
Ellis from further representation of Westinghouse. The defendants
pointed out that Kirkland & Ellis also represented the American Petro-
leum Institute of which three defendants were members. The record
showed that the Chicago office of Kirkland & Ellis5 was representing
plaintiff Westinghouse while its Washington office was retained by the
API as expert independent counsel to fight legislative proposals in Con-
gress to break up various oil companies.
Judge Marshall denied all the motions to disqualify Kirkland &
Ellis. In a lengthy and well-reasoned opinion, he concluded that dis-
qualification of the firm would be a "drastic, unjustified and inequita-
ble resolution of a minor ethical grievance."' 6 On appeal, the district
court's decision was reversed by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit.7 The court of appeals found that Kirkland & Ellis,
by virtue of its simultaneous representation of Westinghouse and the
API, was counsel for both sides in the lawsuit. This situation was more
than a "minor ethical grievance" according to the Seventh Circuit.
Speaking for the court, Judge Sprecher commented:
Here there exists a very reasonable possibility of improper profes-
sional conduct despite all efforts to segregate the two sizeable groups
of lawyers.
... [Tjhere is no basis for creating separate disqualification rules for
large firms even though the burden of complying with ethical consid-
erations will naturally fall more heavily upon their shoulders. 8
The court directed plaintiff Westinghouse to either dismiss three of
the defendants from the lawsuit or discharge Kirkland & Ellis as its
attorney in the case. The consequence of either of these options was
dire for Kirkland & Ellis. Previously, the firm had billed over two mil-
lion dollars in legal fees as a result of the litigation. If the firm chose to
4. Hereinafter referred to as API.
5. Employing 130 lawyers in Chicago and 40 lawyers in Washington, D.C., Kirkland & Ellis
is one of the largest law firms in the United States. 580 F.2d at 1318.
6. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 448 F. Supp. 1284, 1306 (N.D. Ill.), afl'din
part, rev'd in part sub nom. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3311 (U.S. Nov. 6, 1978) (No. 78-422).
7. 580 F.2d at 1323. However, the Seventh Circuit did affirm the district court's refusal to
disqualify Kirkland on another defendant's motion. Id at 1322-23.
8. Id at 1321 (footnote omitted).
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remain in the case by dismissing some of the key defendants it would
jeopardize millions of dollars in the event of a settlement or a success-
ful trial and appeal. The Seventh Circuit's decision raised some obvi-
ous questions: How had Kirkland & Ellis landed in such a
predicament? What lesson did the court have in mind for all private
practitioners? Was the court's decision correct under the circum-
stances?
As the court clearly pointed out, the client is no longer simply the
person who walks into a law office. Under Westinghouse an attorney-
client relationship may arise even though there is no written or oral
request, no direct payment of legal fees, no preparation of a legally
binding document like a contract for services. Kirkland & Ellis' down-
fall in this litigation was the result of the fiduciary relationship which
had developed from the work performed for the API and the circum-
stances under which confidential information was disclosed. Even
though Kirkland & Ellis was not directly retained or paid by any of the
defendants individually, the court construed a professional relationship
because of the work performed indirectly for three of the defendants
through their membership in the API. 9
Unfortunately, in attempting to reach a very admirable result, the
appellate court appears to have ignored the realities of the billion dol-
lar industry involved and the role played by the various law firms and
individual lawyers. As Judge Marshall noted, it was important to con-
sider whether the public interest in reasonable electricity rates would
suffer if Kirkland & Ellis was disqualified from the suit.' 0 This case
obviously involved a "mind boggling" and highly complex factual his-
tory. The allegations of conspiracy and price fixing concern the entire
uranium industry. Kirkland & Ellis lawyers had spent years preparing
the suit and the defense must have realized that forcing new counsel
into the case worked only to their advantage. Further, the frequency of
the filing of disqualification motions easily demonstrates how they are
used solely as a litigation tactic to stall or reduce the opponents' credi-
bility or effectiveness."
9. Id at 1320.
10. 448 F. Supp. at 1306.
11. See, e.g., Allegaert v. Perot, 565 F.2d 246, 251 (2d Cir. 1977) in which the Second Circuit
noted their "concern ... that disqualification motions have become 'common tools of the litiga-
tion process, being used . . . for purely strategic purposes' . . . ." (quoting Van Graafeiland,
Lawyer's Conflict of Interest-A Judge's View (Part II), - N.Y.L.J.- (1977)). See also Commu-
nity Broadcasting of Boston, Inc. v. FCC, 546 F.2d 1022, 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1976); W.T. Grant Co. v.
Haines, 531 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1976); International Elec. Corp. v. Flanzer, 527 F.2d 1288, 1289 (2d
Cir. 1975); Lefrak v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 527 F.2d 1136, 1141 (2d Cir. 1975); Redd v. Shell Oil
Co., 518 F.2d 311, 315-16 (10th Cir. 1975).
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In considering the disqualification motions Judge Marshall made
two findings of fact which were ignored by the court of appeals. He
found that:
Kirkland's experience in the contracts litigation will be invaluable to
the efficient prosecution of the antitrust phase of the dispute, and;
[t]o force Kirkland to give up the reins to an inexperienced driver at
this stage of the journey will cause inevitable delay in the progress of
the litigation and may well compromise the just resolution of a vital
public issue. 12
The most disappointing consequence of the Seventh Circuit's deci-
sion is that an attorney-client relationship can arise unilaterally even
though both sides do not communicate their consent. Consider the
facts in the Westinghouse case. Allegedly the representatives of various
oil companies met and decided to take over the uranium market. One
objective was to eliminate Westinghouse. Part of the plan to eliminate
could conceivably be the hiring of Kirkland & Ellis to assist the API.
It's a classic case of hiring the opposition's lawyers to perform work
against their present client. However, in order for the plan to succeed,
the lawyer must not realize he is working against his own client. In
representing the API, Kirkland was not privy to the alleged plans to
eliminate Westinghouse. The Seventh Circuit overlooked this point. If
in fact Kirkland & Ellis lawyers in Chicago and Washington were rep-
resenting adverse interests, it would have been obvious. Traditionally
an attorney hired by an association, such as the API, represented only
the association as a whole and not the individual members.' 3 In addi-
tion, the Kirkland firm took specific steps to construct a "Chinese
Wall" 14 between the eight to fourteen Chicago-based attorneys work-
ing for Westinghouse and the six Washington, D.C. lawyers working
for the API.
The court specifically rejected the "Chinese Wall" contention even
though there was only one time when the lawyers from each office may
have improperly communicated.15 The court strictly interpreted the
12. 448 F. Supp. at 1306.
13. See, e.g., First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 571 F.2d 390, 396 (7th Cir.), rev'd
on rehearing en banc, - F.2d - (1978); Whiting Corp. v. White Mach. Corp., 567 F.2d 713, 715
(7th Cir. 1977) (per curiam); Schloetter v. Railoc of Ind., Inc., 546 F.2d 706, 710 (7th Cir. 1976);
Cannon v. U.S. Acoustics Corp., 398 F. Supp. 209, 215 (N.D. Ill. 1975), aI'd, 532 F.2d 1118 (7th
Cir. 1976).
14. The "Chinese Wall" was built on the distance between the Chicago and Washington
offices and the fact that the two groups of attorneys did not communicate with each other or
discuss the pending case. The wall was breached on only one occasion according to affidavits filed
with the court. 580 F.2d at 1321.
15. Id
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 916 which deals with the
appearance of impropriety. Other courts have held that for a conflict of
interest to occur "[tjhere must be at least a reasonable possibility that
some specifically identifiable impropriety did in fact occur;"' 17 and, that
the public distrust outweighs the social interest served by the lawyer's
participation. 18 The trial court in Westinghouse relied heavily on this
second factor and found that the ultimate social interest was served
best by Kirkland's representation in the case.' 9
In summary the court of appeals' holding in Westinghouse stands
for the proposition that an attorney-client relationship can occur unin-
tentionally. If in this case the defendant oil companies became clients
of the Kirkland firm, it can only be said that they came in through the
back door. Certainly the disclosure of information through the API
was not intended by either the oil companies nor Kirkland & Ellis to
establish an attorney-client relationship. The practical effect of the de-
cision is that all large firms should now beware of any representations
of associations or institutes that could possibly jeopardize continued
representation of their present clients. Acquisition of new clients by
implication, as happened to Kirkland & Ellis in this case, can be a
costly and embarrassing situation.20
RULE 23: CLASS ACTIONS
Class action problems have continued to reach the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit despite the general rule
against interlocutory appeals. The magnitude of the problems they
present and the scope of the litigation they cover seems to require con-
tinuing supervision by the appellate court. Indeed the Seventh Circuit
has previously recognized that questions under Rule 2321 relating to
16. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY CANON No. 9 states, "A lawyer should
avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety."
17. Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 813 (5th Cir. 1976). See also Note, 31
MIAMI L. REv. 1516 (1977).
18. Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 813 n.12 (5th Cir. 1976); General Mo-
tors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639, 649 (2d Cir. 1974); Emile Indus., Inc. v. Patentex,
Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 575 (2d Cir. 1973).
19. 448 F. Supp. at 1306.
20. The following cases should also be reviewed to more fully measure the court's views on
questions of conflict of interest and their remedies: First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp.,
571 F.2d 390 (7th Cir.), rev'd on rehearing en banc, - F.2d - (1978) (permitting access by substi-
tuting counsel to "work product" of disqualified counsel); Whiting Corp. v. White Mach. Corp.,
567 F.2d 713 (7th Cir. 1977) (affirming district court's order denying defendant's motion to dis-
qualify counsel but ordering "prophylactic measures to avoid a development of the possibility of a
conflict"); McDonald v. Chicago Milwaukee Corp., 565 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1977) (conflicts in set-
tling class action litigation).
21. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
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class actions will continue and the court has specifically allowed some
appeals on procedural points.
22
At one point in the relatively recent history of Rule 2323 it ap-
peared that the federal courts were attempting to narrow the usefulness
of class actions.U They had become a very powerful weapon in the
hands of consumers, disenfranchised minority groups, and even indi-
vidual stockholders. However, some recent opinions by the Seventh
Circuit indicate that the court is willing to re-establish the class action
suit as a means for many individuals to gain access to the federal
courts. In at least two cases, the court was undaunted by the difficulties
in size, manageability, and scope of divergent issues.
22. See, e.g., Anschul v. Sitmar Cruises, Inc., 544 F.2d 1364 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
907 (1976), in which the court specifically approved a method of appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)
(1970) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976), which provides that the trial court may
certify a controlling issue in the case for an immediate appeal if there is a substantial ground for
difference of opinion and an immediate appeal may materially advance the ultimate termination
of the litigation. For a comprehensive discussion of Anschul see Comment, 53 CHI.-KENT L. REv.
462 (1976).
23. FED. R. CIv. P. 23 (as amended 1966) provides in part:
Rule 23. Class Actions
(a) Prerequisities to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or be
sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to
the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims
or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if the
prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition: (1) the prosecution of
separate actions by or against individual members of the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of
the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party
oposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a
practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to
the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their in-
terests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally appli-
cable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding
declaratory relief with respect to the cass as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class ac-
tion is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include:
(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution
or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning
the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the
desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the par-
ticular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a
class action.
24. In the early seventies restrictive interpretations of FED. R. Civ. P. 23 were prominent.
See, e.g., Hackett v. General Host Corp., 455 F.2d 618 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 927 (1972);
Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank, 56 F.R.D. 587 (N.D. Ill. 1972), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 870 (1976);
Garza v. Chicago Health Clubs, Inc., 56 F.R.D. 548 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Kriger v. European Health
Spa, Inc., 56 F.R.D. 104 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
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For instance, in Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford25 plaintiffs
maintained that the class consisted of the following:
1. Plaintiff [I]ndividuals.
The class represented by plaintiff individuals consists of all resi-
dents of the City of Chicago, and all other persons who are physi-
cally present within the City of Chicago for regular or irregular
periods of time, who engage or have engaged in lawful political, reli-
gious, educational or social activities and who, as a result of these
activities, have been within the last five years, are now, or hereafter
may be, subjected to or threatened by alleged infiltration, physical or
verbal coercion, photographic, electronic, or physical surveillance,
summary punishment, harassment, or dossier collection, mainte-
nance, and dissemination by defendants or their agents.
2. Plaintiff Organizations.
The class represented by plaintiff organizations consists of all
organizations located or operating in the City of Chicago who engage
or have engaged in lawful political, religious, educational or social
activities and who, as a result of these activities have been within the
last five years, are now, or hereafter may be, subjected to or
threatened by alleged infiltration, physical or verbal coercion, photo-
graphic, electronic, or physical surveillance, summary punishment,
harassment, or dossier collection, maintenance, and dissemination by
defendants or their agents. 26
The named defendants included people like the Chicago Chief of Po-
lice and the Attorney General of the United States. The allegation was
that the government illegally spied on plaintiffs' class. Specifically
plaintiffs alleged that the government's activities included "systematic
dossier collection, maintenance and dissemination, use of infiltrators,
informers, unlawful entries and electronic surveillance; and physical
and verbal disruption and intimidation of plaintiffs' constitutionally
protected speech and association." 27 Needless to say, plaintiffs' class
covered a far-flung variety of persons with many diverse and conflict-
ing interests.
Nevertheless, the district court certified the class as appropriate
under Rule 23. The defendants pursued an appeal. In affirming the
class certification the appellate court may have begun a new era in class
litigation. It is difficult to perceive a common question of law or fact or
some type of common relief available to the class in this case.28 Ade-
25. 565 F.2d 975 (7th Cir. 1977).
26. Id at 976.
27. Id at 976 n.l.
28. As defined in the text, the class would include members of various groups including the
John Birch Society, the American Legion, and the Neo-Nazis, as well as Students for A Demo-
cratic Society. The members of some of these groups may possibly approve of the defendants'
actions. In addition, it's difficult to believe that any court could fashion relief that would satisfy
such groups of divergent political interests.
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quacy of representation could become a serious problem.29 In addi-
tion, there are serious questions about the manageability of a class that
theoretically could be composed of hundreds of thousands of citizens.
30
Despite these difficulties the court liberally interpreted the rule in favor
of maintenance of a class action.
3'
First the court considered whether or not the definition of plain-
tiffs' class was too vague. The definition of the class is tremendously
important, especially at the conclusion of the litigation. The entire
principle of res judicata32 depends upon a clear understanding of the
issue and the parties involved. In the Alliance to End Repression case,
the defendants contended that the class description was too vague to
define an ascertainable class.33 In support of this argument, the de-
fendants cited cases in which the scope of the class was defined by the
plaintiffs' conduct or state of mind. Rejecting the defendants' argu-
ment, the Seventh Circuit distinguished this case from those cited by
finding that the scope of the class here was defined by the defendants'
conduct. The class in Alliance to End Repression included "only those
individuals and organizations. . . that have been subjected to. . . un-
constitutional harassment by the defendants." Therefore, the court
reasoned, the class did not fail for lack of "definiteness." 35 Speaking
for the court, Judge Sprecher stated:
Thus, this court has made it clear that a class that satisfies all of the
other requirements of Rule 23 will not be rejected as indefinite when
its contours are defined by the defendants' own conduct.
Any other conclusion in this situation would give rise to an ex-
tremely incongruous result. To hold as defendants request would
permit class action certification to be avoided by a potential defend-
ant merely by expanding the scope of his illegal conduct in order to
29. The interests of the representative plaintiffs may conflict with the interests of the absent
plaintiffs. See, e.g., Inmates of Attica v. Rockefeller, 453 F.2d 12, 24 (2d Cir. 1971).
30. Size alone is not a single determinative factor. Very large classes have been certified. See
Appleton Elec. Co. v. Advance-United Expressways, 494 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1974); Stavrides v.
Mellon Bank, N.A., 69 F.R.D. 424 (W.D. Pa. 1975). However, many suits have been dismissed as
unmanageable. See In re Hotel TeL Charges, 500 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1974); Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1972), vacated on other grounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); Boshes v.
General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589 (N.D. I1. 1973); Dolgow v. Anderson, 53 F.R.D. 664
(E.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 464 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1972).
31. Liberal interpretation of Rule 23 had been approved previously. See Green v. Wolf
Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 298 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969); Esplin v. Hirschi, 402
F.2d 94, 99 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 928 (1969).
32. Under the doctrine of res judicata, a valid final judgment on the merits precludes further
litigation of the same cause of action between the same parties or those in privity with them. IB
MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.401 at 11 (2d ed. 1974). See also Lawlor v. National Screen
Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 326 (1955).
33. 565 F.2d at 977.
34. Id at 978.
35. Id at 977-78.
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make the class of plaintiffs less well-defined. We reject any such re-
sult by holding that the classes certified by the district court are suffi-
ciently definite to satisfy Rule 23.36
This ruling in effect takes the burden off the plaintiffs in attempting to
narrow or define their class. One of the greatest difficulties in establish-
ing a class is eliminated in this type of situation.
The court next confronted the issue of whether there existed a
common issue of law or fact. The Seventh Circuit chose to side-step
this requirement of Rule 23 and again put the onus on the defendant,
stating, "'The common question requirement should not be restric-
tively interpreted [when] to do so would eliminate the class action de-
terrent for those who engage in complicated and imaginative rather
than straight-forward schemes to' violate constitutional rights.
'37
Obviously, from the very nature of the conflicting backgrounds of
the members of the class,3 8 there does not exist a common question of
fact or law. For instance, the defendants may have acted permissibly in
conducting surveillance of a terrorist group. At the same time they
may have acted impermissibly in physically disrupting social and reli-
gious groups. Of course there was a tremendous variety of activities
which constituted the alleged unconstitutional conspiracy among vari-
ous state and federal agencies. Despite these difficulties the court al-
lowed the action to proceed as a class. Apparently, when constitutional
issues are raised, as opposed to pure monetary loss, the court is willing
to stretch the rule to its outer limits.
A third difficulty in the Alliance to End Repression suit is the ade-
quacy of a remedy. Defendants maintained that the court could not
fashion relief sufficiently broad to take account of all potential mem-
bers of the classes.39 Admittedly, it is hard to imagine a final decision
which could satisfy members with such diverse interests. Nevertheless,
the court again stated that it was the defendants' alleged illegality that
created the problem and that "the scope of illegality should not now
shield the defendant from defending against a class action."'
'4
The defendants further argued that the size of the class made it
unmanageable. This argument was probably doomed from the begin-
36. Id at 978.
37. Id at 979 (quoting Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 903 n. 19 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 816 (1976)).
38. See note 28 supra.
39. See Gray v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 73 F.R.D. 638 (D.D.C. 1977); Berlin
Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144 (D.D.C. 1976); Stewart v. Wohlgemuth, 355 F.
Supp. 1212 (W.D. Pa. 1972). Seegenerall, 3B MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 23.40 at 23-292-309
(2d ed. 1978).
40. 565 F.2d at 980.
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ning as the Seventh Circuit has "traditionally been tolerant of the man-
ageability of multi-party litigation."'4' For example, in another recent
decision, Illinois Migrant Council v. Piliod,42 the Seventh Circuit ap-
proved a very large class. Defendants argued that a class consisting of
all persons of Mexican ancestry or of Spanish surname in the Northern
District of Illinois was amorphous and ill-defined. Plaintiffs sought an
injunction against the Immigration and Naturalization Service.43
Plaintiffs alleged that INS conducted a pattern and practice of harass-
ment (including illegal searches, seizures, arrests, interrogations, deten-
tions and mass raids) against persons believed to be illegal aliens.44
The court of appeals affirmed the certification of plaintiffs' class even
though more than one million persons might have been included in the
class.45 The problems in Pilliod were not quite as enormous as the diffi-
culties envisioned in the Alliance to End Repression suit.," The plain-
tiffs in Pilliod simply sought an injunction against future harassment.
There were no problems of notice, damages or counter-claims. The
court apparently considered the simplicity of remedy in allowing the
case to proceed as a class. Frequently, the court will favor a class suit
when egregious conduct can be corrected easily. In those instances
problems of management and size are occasionally overlooked. Judge
Becker considered this issue in Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v.
Methode Electronics, Inc. ,47 when he wrote,48 "The difficulties likely to
be encountered in the management of a class action are not important
when weighed against the benefits to the class, and any subclasses
thereof, and to the administration of justice.
'49
Although the courts are willing to employ class action lawsuits as
vehicles to correct social inequities, the standards of Rule 23 must be
observed. In the Alliance to End Repression suit the court gave Rule 23
the broadest interpretation possible. As the suit makes its way through
the court system it will be interesting to observe how various questions
are handled. For instance, what if the defendants seek to take discov-
41. See Appleton Elec. Co. v. Advance-United Expressways, 494 F.2d 126, 138 (7th Cir.
1974).
42. 540 F.2d 1062 (7th Cir. 1976), mod#edin part on rehearing en banc, 548 F.2d 715 (7th Cir.
1977).
43. Hereinafter referred to as INS.
44. 540 F.2d at 1065.
45. Id at 1073 n.2 (Tone, J., dissenting).
46. See text accompanying notes 25-32 supra.
47. 285 F. Supp. 714 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
48. The Honorable William H. Becker, Chief Judge of the United States District Court for
the Western District of Missouri, was sitting by designation in the Northern District of Illinois.
49. 285 F. Supp. at 724-25.
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ery from some of the absent class members? 50 Some radical groups
may be unwilling to detail the nature of their activities. Of course the
defendants will resist a great deal of the plaintiffs' attempts to discover
who was spying, what type of materials were compiled, and the nature
of the surveillance today.
Discovery problems5' might again bring the Alliance to End
Repression case to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Of course,
the court will continue to consider the defendants' constitutional and
statutory rights to: (1) disprove the claims of the members of the class
which they are opposing; (2) establish their defenses to those claims;
and (3) develop the facts necessary for an intelligent decision as to
whether the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) and (b)5 2 have been satisfied.
MAGISTRATES' JURISDICTION
Despite the fact that federal district courts are becoming inundated
with cases, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
this term, refused to allow any extension of federal magistrates' juris-
diction. In a well-reasoned opinion5 3 by Judge Harlington Wood, the
court commented that innovative experiments were admirable consid-
ering the district courts' heavy case loads but such experiments must
remain within the statutory limitations.
5 4
In Taylor v. Oxford55 the parties agreed by stipulation5 6 to submit
all proceedings in the case, including trial and entry of final judgment,
to the United States magistrate pursuant to Title 28 of the United
States Code5 7 and Rule 38 of the Rules of Practice for the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Illinois. 58 The case involved a
50. Information from absent class members may be necessary to either define the claims of
the class members or to permit the defendants an opportunity to develop their defenses.
51. The Seventh Circuit has frequently reviewed discovery problems in class actions. See,
e.g., Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070 (1974);
Appleton Elec. Co. v. Advance-United Expressways, 494 F.2d 126, 138 (7th Cir. 1974); Brennan v.
Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 999 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 921 (1972).
52. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a), (b).
53. Taylor v. Oxford, No. 77-1647 (7th Cir. May 5, 1978).
54. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l)(A) (1976) states:
[A1 judge may designate a magistrate to hear and determine any pretrial matter
pending before the court, except a motion for injunctive relief, for judgment on the
pleadings, for summary judgment, to dismiss or quash an indictment or information
made by the defendant to suppress evidence in a criminal case, to dismiss or to permit
maintenance of a class action, to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted, and to involuntarily dismiss an action.
55. No. 77-1647 (7th Cir. May 5, 1978).
56. Id, slip op. at 3.
57. See note 54 supra and note 62 mfra.
58. Rule 38(b)(12) of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Illinois pro-
vides that a magistrate may, "[w]ith the written consent of the parties, hear and determine all
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complaint against the sheriff and various other public officials for an
alleged wrongful overnight detention of plaintiff in the Williamson
County Jail. The magistrate reviewed the motions filed by the parties
and granted the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted.
59
Plaintiff filed a direct appeal to the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals. The court directed the parties to address the question of jurisdic-
tion since the issue was controlling to the litigation as well as a question
of first impression. After hearing the arguments the court ruled that
there was no jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.6
However, in dismissing the appeal, the Seventh Circuit did pro-
vide some appropriate comment on the scope of powers allowed to fed-
eral magistrates. The court noted that magistrates' jurisdiction and
powers cannot be widened simply by stipulation of the parties. Judge
Wood stated, "The Statute makes no mention, no exception, and grants
no additional power to a magistrate by reason of the consent of the
parties, and in particular no otherwise excepted power to enter final
judgment following the magistrate's ruling on a dispositive motion."'
61
Under the federal statute,62 a magistrate may be assigned addi-
tional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of
the United States. However, the court did not construe this section as
a basis for extending the magistrates' jurisdiction. Under section
636(b)(3) of the statute63 magistrates are allowed to take on such ad-
ministrative duties as reviewing default judgments, accepting jury ver-
dicts, and appointing counsel, but they are not allowed to usurp a
function reserved to the district court. Nothing in the Seventh Circuit's
opinion appears to limit the established practice of having magistrates
conduct hearings and submit proposed findings to the district court for
the final ruling and disposition.64
Unfortunately, the impact of Taylor is that the magistrates' courts
cannot provide any real remedy to the tremendous problem of delay in
motions, conduct the trial, and enter findings of fact and conclusions of law and final judgments in
civil cases when specifically referred by a District Court Judge." E.D. ILL. R. 38(b)(12).
59. Taylor v. Oxford, No. 77-1647, slip op. at 2-3 (7th Cir. May 5, 1978).
60. Id at 5.
61. Id at 4.
62. 28 U.S.C. § 636(bX3) provides that "[a] magistrate may be assigned such additional du-
ties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States." 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(4) provides that "[elach district court shall establish rules pursuant to which the magistrates
shall discharge their duties."
63. See note 54 supra.
64. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l)(B) states, "[A] judge may also designate a magistrate to conduct
hearings, including evidentiary hearings, and to submit to a judge of the court proposed findings
of fact and recommendations for the disposition, by a judge of the court .. "
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the litigation of civil cases. A change in the magistrates' jurisdiction
and function can only be accomplished by Congress. The Seventh Cir-
cuit recognized that broadening the magistrates' usefulness depends on
congressional action and pointed out that such a bill is currently under
review.65 Presently the court calendars are choked by cases which
could be adequately handled by federal magistrates. For instance, pris-
oner suits under titles 2254 and 2255,66 review of Social Security benefit
cases, condemnation cases, civil forfeiture proceedings, and even some
diversity cases involving simply facts and minor damages could be re-
solved more expeditiously in a magistrate's court. Hopefully, Congress
will act in the near future to resolve this dilemma. 67 In the interim,
Taylor v. Oxford68 will act to limit any real extension of the magis-
trates' jurisdiction to finally resolve litigation.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Probably one of the most significant decisions by the Seventh Cir-
cuit in 1977 was Beard v. Robinson.69 The questions presented to the
court were whether damage claims brought against a state officer under
the Civil Rights Acts of 196470 and against federal officers under the
fourth amendment survive the death of the injured party, and whether
a relatively short two-year statute of limitations or a five-year period
applies. In a very concise and logical opinion, Judge Bauer, writing for
the entire court,71 concluded that the action survived under the appro-
priate state and federal law and that the five-year statute of limitations
was applicable. In making this determination the court overruled its
previous holding in Jones v. Jones72 and took a firm stand on an issue
that has been dividing the various circuits for years.73
65. Senate Bill 1612 would greatly enhance the jurisdiction of federal magistrates by permit-
ting them to conduct any civil proceeding with the consent of the parties. See Taylor v. Oxford,
No. 77-1647, slip op. at 5 n.7 (7th Cir. May 5, 1978).
66. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254, 2255 (1976).
67. Congress has already acted on the delay in criminal cases by passing the Speedy Trial Act
of 1974, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (1976). However, this Act has created a situation wherein few civil cases
can actually be tried in the district court. Some federal court judges were unable to try any civil
cases during 1978 due to the number of criminal trials.
68. No. 77-1647 (7th Cir. May 5, 1978).
69. 563 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1977).
70. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976).
71. Because the Beard holding overruled prior Seventh Circuit cases the opinion was circu-
lated before publication to the other members of the court. Since no other member disagreed with
the decision by calling for a rehearing en banc, portions of the Beard decision were given tacit
approval by the entire court. See 563 F.2d at 336.
72. 410 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1013 (1970), overruled i Beard v.
Robinson, 563 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1977).
73. 563 F.2d at 337-38 n.7.
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In Beard, the plaintiff alleged that her son was murdered by for-
mer Chicago policeman Stanley Robinson and William O'Neal, an in-
formant for the F.B.I. At the time of the murder the F.B.I. was
conducting an undercover investigation of corruption in the Chicago
Police Department. Stanley Robinson was a key subject of the investi-
gation. After Beard was killed Robinson was convicted of murdering
him. The plaintiff alleged that the F.B.I., through its informant Wil-
liam O'Neal, either encouraged Beard's murder or failed to take steps
to prevent his death.
74
The district court dismissed the complaint on the basis that it was
time barred by the Illinois two-year statute of limitations applicable to
claims for physical injury.75 In reversing the dismissal, the Seventh
Circuit was required to devise its own roadmap through a maze of con-
fficting decisions. Neither the Civil Rights Acts76 nor Bivens v. Six Un-
known NamedAgent 77 (the landmark case providing the jurisdictional
base for a suit against federal officers) established a time limit within
which a civil rights suit must be brought. Previously, it had been estab-
lished that a federal court should look to state law in applying an ap-
propriate statute of limitations.78 But in looking to the state law, the
Seventh Circuit encountered another difficulty: Which Illinois statute
was applicable?
Plaintiff urged that the court follow Wakat v. Harlib79 and apply
the Illinois five-year statute of limitations.80 The defendants argued
that the district court had correctly interpreted the Jones case and the
two-year statute. The court of appeals analyzed each of the earlier de-
cisions in detail and concluded:
Upon reflection, it seems to us that Wakat and Jones cannot
stand together, for underlying the inconsistent results reached therein
are two inconsistent approaches to determining the applicable statute
of limitations. The Wakat approach treats all claims founded on the
Civil Rights Acts as governed by the five-year Illinois statute of limi-
tations applicable to all statutory causes of action that do not contain
their own limitations periods. Jones, on the other hand, looks be-
yond the fact that a statutory cause of action has been alleged and
seeks to characterize the facts underlying plaintiffs claim in terms of
traditional common law torts for purposes of determining the appli-
74. Id at 332.
75. An Act in Regard to Limitations § 14, ILL. Rv. STAT. ch. 83 § 15 (1977).
76. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, 1988 (1970) (amended 1976).
77. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
78. Duncan v. Nelson, 466 F.2d 939, 941 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 894 (1972);
O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318 (1914).
79. 253 F.2d 59 (7th Cir. 1958).
80. An Act in Regard to Limitations § 15, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83 § 16 (1977).
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cable state statute of limitations. Faced with these two conflicting
approaches that have generated inconsistent results within the Cir-
cuit we now believe it is necessary to overrule Jones and adopt the
Wa/cat rule as the law of the Circuit ...
We believe our choice of the Wakat rule is compelled by funda-
mental differences between a civil rights action and a common law
tort.8S
The court went on to hold further that the five-year statute of limita-
tions would be applicable to federal defendants as well as to a state
officer defendant.
82
In opting for the longer five-year general statute of limitations pe-
riod in civil rights cases, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ex-
presses a common concern that a civil rights deprivation is not a
traditional tort action. This attitude is in keeping with recent decisions
of the United States Supreme Court.8 3 The case may put additional
burdens on federal and state officers who are constantly threatened
with vexatious as well as legitimate lawsuits as they perform their du-
ties. However, decisions based on the merits as opposed to procedural
dismissals based on the statute of limitations will probably be more
satisfying to all potential litigants.
RULE 19: INDISPENSABLE PARTIES
During the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals' last term, two cases
considered rather interesting questions under Rule 1984 which sets out
the standards for dismissal for failure to join an indispensable party.
The cases, Bonnet v. Trustees of Schools5 and Bio-Analytical Services,
Inc. v. Edgewater Hospital, Inc. ,86 present some rather novel factual
situations which may not have been contemplated by the committee
drafting Rule 19.
In Bonnet, the district court dismissed the lawsuit for failure to
join an indispensable party.87 Plaintiff Leona Bonnet was a resident of
Florida. Defendants were Illinois residents and held title to certain real
estate in Illinois. Plaintiff Bonnet inherited an interest in a parcel of
real estate which the school board had previously taken through emi-
nent domain. The theory of her complaint was quite simple. She al-
leged that since the school board had stopped using the land for school
81. 563 F.2d at 336 (footnote omitted).
82. Id at 338.
83. See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976).
84. FED. R. Civ. P. 19.
85. 563 F.2d 831 (7th Cir. 1977).
86. 565 F.2d 450 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3207 (U.S. Oct. 2, 1978) (No. 77-
1518).
87. 563 F.2d at 832.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
purposes the title reverted back to the original owner before the con-
demnation. Since she had inherited the original condemnee's interest
she now brought suit in federal court, alleging diversity, seeking a de-
claratory judgment that she had title to the real estate.
88
On the face of the complaint it appeared that jurisdiction was
proper. However, the problem arose because the defendants asserted
that the real plaintiff was not Leona Bonnet but rather her lawyer, Ar-
thur M. Scheller, Jr. The defendants introduced into the record a con-
tract between the plaintiff and her lawyer.89 Basically, the agreement
provided that the lawyer, Scheller, had the right to attempt to perfect
the plaintiff Bonnet's title to the real estate. The lawyer agreed to file
suit, take appeals, and pay all costs and expenses in an attempt to ob-
tain title for Bonnet. She agreed to sell the property for $10,500 to the
lawyer if he was successful in obtaining title in Bonnet's name.
In light of the contract the question was whether or not the lawyer
was the real plaintiff and an indispensable party. Of course, if he was
considered an indispensable party, his presence would destroy diversity
of parties and the suit would be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.90
The district court decided that the contract worked an equitable con-
version under Illinois law so that the lawyer had a real interest in prop-
erty. Therefore, the court dismissed the lawsuit for failure to join an
indispensable party.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit va-
cated the dismissal in a divided opinion.9' The majority opinion is a
classic analysis of Rule 19.92 Judge Fairchild's opinion follows the rule
88. Id
89. Id
90. Id at 833.
91. 563 F.2d at 835.
92. FED. R. Civ. P. provides:
Rule 19. Joinder of Persons Needed for Just Adjudication
(a) Persons to be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject to service of process and
whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the sub ect matter of action
shall be joined as a party in the action if (I) in his absence cornplete relief cannot be
accorded among those already parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject
of the action and is so situated that the dispsition of the action in his absence may (i) as
a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of
the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or
otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. If he has not been so
joined, the court shall order that he be made a party. If he should join as a plaintiff but
refuses to do so, he may be made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary
plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue and his joinder would render the venue of
the action improper, he shall be dismissed from the action.
(b) Determination by Court Whenever Joinder not Feasible. If a person as described
in subdivision (aX i)(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court shall determine
whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties
before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable.
The factors to be considered by the court include: first, to what extent a judgment ren-
dered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to him or those already parties; sec-
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to the letter. In determining whether "in equity and good conscience
the action should proceed among the parties, '93 the court considered
the factors outlined in Rule 19(b):
[F]irst, to what extent a judgment rendered in a person's absence
might be prejudicial to him or those already parties; second, the ex-
tent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shap-
ing of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or
avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence
will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate
remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.
94
Obviously, in Bonnet the lawyer would suffer no prejudice by not
becoming a named party. He was running the lawsuit and could fully
protect his interest. Any judgment rendered by the court could be
shaped by him to protect his interest. The judgment rendered would
adequately protect both parties. The lawyer would be bound by the
plaintiff's judgment since he is in privity with her by virtue of the con-
tract. However, when one considers the fourth factor (other available
adequate remedies), it becomes apparent that the plaintiff would have
an adequate remedy in state court if the federal suit was dismissed.
Nonetheless, the Seventh Circuit was reluctant to affirm a dismissal
under Rule 19 simply because other forums were available. 95
Since the court of appeals believed that the district court could
fashion an adequate remedy even in the absence of the lawyer as a
named party they reversed the dismissal. 96 However the only reason
that the non-joined plaintiffs interest is protected is due to the unusual
nature of Scheller-both a party in interest as well as the advocate.
The dissenting member of the panel in Bonnet, Judge Bauer, did
not really take issue with the court's analysis of Rule 19. Instead, he
believed that the lawyer Scheller was the real party in interest under
the doctrine of equitable conversion. 97 The approach of the majority
opinion was to abide strictly by the strictures of Rule 19 in reaching a
decision. Judge Bauer's dissenting opinion seems to strike at the heart
of the issue by passing an analysis of the rule in an attempt to reach a
ond, the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of
relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judg-
ment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiffwill
have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.
(c) Pleading Reasons for Nonjoinder. A pleading asserting a claim for relief shall
state the names, if known to the pleader, of any persons as described in subdivision
(a)(l)-(2) hereof who are not joined, and the reasons why they are not joined.
(d) Exception of Class Actions. This rule is subject to the provisions of Rule 23.
93. FED. R. Civ. P. 19(b). See note 92 supra.
94. Id
95. 563 F.2d at 833.
96. id at 833, 835.
97. Id at 835-36 (Bauer, J., dissenting).
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common-sense solution to the problem. Both approaches to this very
unique problem are noteworthy. Certainly the facts of Bonnet could
not have been contemplated by the drafters of Rule 19 nor adequately
covered in a single procedural rule.
Bio-Analytical Services, Inc. v. Edgewater Hospital, Inc. 98 was the
second Rule 19 case decided by the Seventh Circuit during the last
term. Chief Judge Fairchild again authored the court's opinion which
reversed the district court's dismissal for failure to join an indispensa-
ble party.99 Unlike Bonnet the emphasis in Bio-Analytical Services ap-
pears to be on the "in equity and good conscience" clause of Rule
19(b)100 and the adoption of a pragmatic approach.
In this action, plaintiff Bio-Analytical, a New York corporation,
alleged that it had contracted with the defendant hospital, an Illinois
corporation, to provide certain services in the pathology department.
The president of Bio-Analytical was Dr. Mark, an Illinois resident and
the alleged indispensable party. Dr. Mark was to perform the services
described in the contract between plaintiff and defendant. In addition,
he gave a personal guarantee which was appended to the contract.
However, no compensation was to be paid to him. Instead, the pay-
ments were to go to the plaintiff corporation of which he was presi-
dent.1' 1 Of course, if Dr. Mark was found to be an indispensable party
to the action, his presence as an Illinois resident would defeat diversity
jurisdiction. 1
0 2
As in Bonnet 0 3 the court of appeals analyzed the issue by applying
the four determining factors set forth in Rule 19(b). 104 It is interesting
to note that the court gave very little emphasis to the fourth factor-the
availability of an alternative forum. The opinion indicates that a suit
involving the same parties was also filed in state court. l05 Despite this
alternative forum and the fact that historically federal courts have exer-
cised only limited jurisdiction, the court retained jurisdiction. The
court stated:
98. 565 F.2d 450 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3207 (U.S. Oct. 2, 1978) (No. 77-
1518).
99. Id at 455.
100. See note 92 supra.
101. 565 F.2d at 451-52.
102. Id at 452-53.
103. See text accompanying notes 87-97 supra.
104. 565 F.2d at 452.
105. It is interesting that the record reflects that on July 14, 1975 Edgewater Hospital sued Bio-
Analytical and Dr. Mark in state court. Approximately eighteen minutes later, Bio-Analytical
sued Edgewater Hospital in federal court. Id This appears to be literally a race to the courthouse.
Of course in federal court the fact that one party was designated plaintiff and the other defendant
has little or no bearing on the outcome of the case.
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We recognize that the pending state court action brought by Edgewa-
ter would provide an alternative forum thus arguably satisfying the
fourth criteria of 19(b), the availability of an alternative remedy in
the event of dismissal. We note, however, that the state court action
was initiated by Edgewater and, in any event, "we do not view the
availability of an alternative remedy, standing alone, as a sufficient
reason for deciding that the action should not proceed among the
parties before the court. I O 6
In effect, the court assigned very little importance to the availabil-
ity of another forum. The only authority cited for this interpretation of
the rule in Bio-Analytical is the Seventh Circuit's earlier decision in
Bonnet. 0 7 Nevertheless, the court's interpretation of the rule appears
to be based on sound reasoning. First, the spirit of Rule 19 is premised
on a decision which employs "equity and good conscience." Second,
reliance on the availability of a forum in state court is often misplaced.
Too often state courts are unable to fashion appropriate relief or are
unable to review the case with total freedom from local pressures or
political concerns.
In sum, the Bio-Analytical and Bonnet reversals signify a strict atti-
tude toward dismissals under Rule 19. A case will not be dismissed
under Rule 19 unless it is clearly established that the party is indispen-
sable-not simply because another adequate forum exists or because
the relief required will be difficult to fashion.
CONCLUSION
During 1977-78, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit made certain procedural decisions which will undoubtedly
have considerable impact on civil litigation. Perhaps the case having
the most dramatic consequences is Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Kerr-
McGee Corp.08 in which the court found an attorney-client relation-
ship by implication. As a result of the Westinghouse case, law firms
will have to be more careful when representing organizations as their
representation could lay the foundation for a potential conflict of inter-
est. This article has suggested that while the court was trying to reach a
very admirable result, it overlooked the realities of the situation. 0 9
A second issue examined by the Seventh Circuit last term was the
availability of class actions. In at least two cases, Alliance to End Re-
106. Id at 453 (quoting Bonnet v. Trustees of Schools, 563 F.2d 831, 833 (7th Cir. 1977)).
107. See text accompanying notes 87-97 supra.
108. 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3311 (U.S. Nov. 6, 1978) (No. 78-
422).
109. See text accompanying notes 3-20 supra.
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pression v. Rochford' ° and Illinois Migrant Council v. Piliod,III the
court approved class certification despite manageability problems. In
the Alliance to End Repression case, the court effectively removed the
plaintiffs' burden of narrowly defining the class and indicated that the
defendants would not be able to avoid a class action caused by their
alleged illegality. In Piliod the court quickly approved a very large
class by apparently considering the simplicity of the remedy sought,
ie., an injunction. Both cases represent the Seventh Circuit's willing-
ness to use class actions to remedy social inequities, even if this requires
liberally construing Rule 23.112
While the court was willing to give a broad interpretation to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the class action cases, it strictly
construed the federal statute defining magistrates' jurisdiction. In Tay-
lor v. Oxford," 13 after dismissing the appeal on jurisdictional grounds,
the court commented that expansion of the federal magistrates' powers
was a congressional function. Because the federal courts are inundated
with litigation, it is hoped that Congress will expand the magistrates'
jurisdiction.' 14
In another very important decision, Beard v. Robinson,' 15 the Sev-
enth Circuit found that the applicable statute of limitations for actions
under the Civil Rights Act" 6 is five years. This holding reflects the
prevailing view that civil rights actions are not traditional common law
tort cases.' "
7
A final issue which the Seventh Circuit analyzed during the last
term involved the standards for dismissal for failure to join an indis-
pensable party under Rule 19. 1 "8From Bonnet v. Trustees of Schools' 19
and Bio-Analytical Services, Inc. v. Edgewater Hospital, Inc. 120 one de-
rives the rule that unless a party can be shown to be clearly indispen-
sable, a case will not be dismissed under Rule 19. This strict
110. 565 F.2d 975 (7th Cir. 1977).
111. 540 F.2d 1062 (7th Cir. 1976), modfed in part on rehearing en banc, 548 F.2d 715 (7th Cir.
1977).
112. FED. R. Civ. P. 23. See text accompanying notes 21-52 supra.
113. No. 77-1647 (7th Cir. May 5, 1978).
114. See text accompanying notes 53-68 upra.
115. 563 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1977).
116. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976).
117. See text accompanying notes 69-83 spra.
118. FED. R. Ctv. P. 19.
119. 563 F.2d 831 (7th Cir. 1977).
120. 565 F.2d 450 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3207 (U.S. Oct. 2, 1978) (No. 77-
1518).
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interpretation appears to be in keeping with the policy behind Rule
19.121
In sum, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
resolved important procedural issues during the 1977-78 term. An
overview of the cases indicates that attorneys in this circuit generally
use the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure skillfully. In discussing the
more significant cases, this article has disagreed with the court in some
cases and applauded the results in others.
121. See text accompanying notes 84-107 supra.
